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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether taxes on unhealthy food are suitable for internal-
izing intergenerational externalities inflicted by parents when they decide on
their children's diet. In an overlapping generations (OLG) model with an imper-
fectly altruistic parent, the optimal steady-state tax rate on unhealthy food is
strictly positive. However, it is only second-best because, in addition to reducing
unhealthy consumption by the child, it distorts the parent's unhealthy consump-
tion. Surprisingly, the optimal tax may underinternalize or overinternalize the
marginal damage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), such as diabetes, are the major cause of death worldwide, accounting for 70% of all
deaths (WHO, 2017). Unhealthy diets are one of the main risk factors associated with obesity, which, in turn, is a major
cause of NCDs. Hence, in its Global Action Plan for the prevention and control of NCDs, the World Health Organization
calls for policies to address obesity and explicitly favors taxation of unhealthy food (WHO, 2013). For example, taxes
on sugary drinks (soda tax) have been introduced in over 20 countries and in more than half of the U.S. states (Lloyd
& MacLaren, 2019). In the economic literature, taxes on unhealthy food (or sin taxes, in general) are justified based
on individuals' lack of self-control (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2003; 2006), misperceived health costs (Cremer et al., 2016),
negative cost externalities through health insurance (Allcott et al., 2019), and intergenerational transmission of NCDs
from parents to their children (Goulão & Pérez-Barahona, 2014).
Here, we examine whether such taxes are suitable for internalizing intergenerational externalities inflicted by imper-
fectly altruistic parents when they decide on their children's diet. According to OECD (2017), one out of six children is
overweight or obese, implying a higher risk of obesity and related NCDs in adulthood. Parents have a significant impact
on their children's diet and are often not perfectly altruistic vis-à-vis their children. The most direct evidence is provided
by Bruhin and Winkelmann (2009), who study how children's happiness affects their parents' utility, estimating that only
21% to 27% of parents are altruistic. Hence, when choosing their children's diet, parents might not fully consider their
children's future health costs and, thus, inflict an intergenerational externality.
We investigate this externality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model of a family in which the parent chooses both
its own and its child's diet. Unhealthy food consumption in childhood increases a person's body mass index (BMI) and
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health costs in adulthood and creates habits that raise the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption in adulthood. The
parent is imperfectly altruistic and thus considers only a part of the child's future utility and health costs. The government
taxes unhealthy food; for simplicity, we refer to this tax as a fat tax. We find that the optimal steady-state tax rate on
unhealthy food is indeed strictly positive. However, it is only second-best because, in addition to reducing the food con-
sumption of the child, it distorts the parent's food consumption, which is not associated with an externality. Surprisingly,
the optimal tax rate may underinternalize or overinternalize the marginal damage. A tax rate increase in a given period
reduces the parent's food consumption in this period, resulting in underinternalization. However, the corresponding
reduction in the child's consumption ceteris paribus reduces the BMI in adulthood, which may cause parent consumption
in the next period to increase. If this effect is sufficiently large, the second-best tax overinternalizes the marginal damage.
This study is related to the literature on optimal sin taxes. With the notable exception of Goulão and Pérez-Barahona
(2014), previous works largely ignore intergenerational externalities between parents and children (see Allcott et al., 2019,
for a survey). Goulão and Pérez-Barahona (2014) model a family in which parents choose an unhealthy activity (e.g., food
consumption) that influences their health capital, which is later inherited by their children. Parents are imperfectly altru-
istic and do not consider their children's future utility when deciding on the unhealthy activity. The optimal tax on the
unhealthy activity is strictly positive, as in our work. However, in their analysis, the optimal tax is always first-best, because
they do not include a second margin, which the tax erroneously distorts. Hence, the important contribution of our study
is to identify parents' food consumption as a second margin that renders a tax on unhealthy food second-best.
Our study is also related to the literature on imperfect altruism and intergenerational externalities. See Cremer and
Pestieau (2006) and Kopczuk (2013) for surveys of this literature. Except for Goulão and Pérez-Barahona (2014), related
studies tend to examine positive externalities that emerge from inheritances when parents are altruistic. Such externalities
may call for subsidization of bequests (Cremer & Pestieau, 2006; Farhi & Werning, 2010). We contribute to the literature
on intergenerational externalities by analyzing the long-term effects of parents' choices related to their children's diets
and the implications of these effects for optimal tax policy.
2 MODEL
Consider an OLG model of a representative family.1 In each period, the family consists of a parent and a child, and each
individual lives two periods, childhood and adulthood. In period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …}, the child's utility from consuming xct
units of unhealthy food and zct units of healthy food is given by
uct = z
c
t + V
c(xct ), (1)
where V c(xct ) exhibits positive and declining marginal utility from unhealthy foods, such that V
c
x (xct ) > 0 > V
c
xx(xct ).
2 The
child's consumption is chosen by the parent, not the child. In period t, the parent receives consumption utility zpt +V
p(xpt , st)
from the consumption of zpt units of healthy food and x
p
t units of unhealthy food. The utility of unhealthy food consumption
is V p(xpt , st) and is influenced by habits, defined as
st = xct−1. (2)
Hence, habits equal unhealthy consumption during childhood. In addition, the parent in period t has to bear health
costs C(qt) that are positively correlated with the BMI:
qt = xpt + 𝛾x
c
t−1. (3)
The BMI is equal to unhealthy consumption during adulthood, plus a share 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1] of the unhealthy consumption
during childhood. The net utility of the parent in period t is given by
upt = z
p
t + V
p(xpt , st) − C(qt). (4)
1All our results hold in a model with family heterogeneity, provided there is a positive mass of families with imperfectly altruistic parents. The optimal
tax then turns out to be third-best.
2Throughout the paper, uppercase letters denote functions and subscripts attached to them indicate (partial) derivatives, for example, V cx (xct ) ∶=
dV c(xct )∕dx
c
t ,V
c
xx(xct ) ∶= d2V c(x
c
t )∕d(x
c
t )2.
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The utility function Vp exhibits positive and declining marginal utility from unhealthy food; that is, V px (x
p
t , st) > 0 >
V pxx(x
p
t , st). The marginal utility of habits is assumed to be negative and declining; thus, V
p
s (x
p
t , st) < 0 and V
p
ss(x
p
t , st) < 0.
Moreover, the utility function satisfies V pxs(x
p
t , st) > 0. Hence, the parent's marginal utility from unhealthy food consump-
tion is increasing in past consumption and, ceteris paribus, incentivizes the adult to consume more when more was eaten
during childhood.3 Finally, the marginal health costs are positive and increasing; that is, Cq(qt) > 0 and Cqq(qt) ≥ 0.
The long-term utility of the parent in period t is equal to
Wt = uct + u
p
t + 𝛼Wt+1, (5)
where Wt+1 is the long-term utility of a child born in period t when it becomes a parent in period t+1. The weight 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]
determines the degree of (intergenerational) altruism. If 𝛼 = 1, the parent fully considers the long-term utility of its child
and is perfectly altruistic. For 𝛼 = 0, the parent is nonaltruistic. If 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1), the parent is imperfectly altruistic. Lastly,
the family's budget constraint in period t is given by
zpt + z
c
t + (1 + 𝜏t)(x
p
t + x
c
t ) = e + 𝓁t, (6)
where e is a given income, 𝓁t represents a lump sum transfer received from the government, and 𝜏 t is the tax rate on
unhealthy food consumption (i.e., the fat tax). All producer prices are normalized to unity.
3 CONSUMPTION CHOICE OF THE PARENT
In period t, the parent chooses its own consumption, zpt and x
p
t , and the child's consumption, z
c
t and x
c
t , in order to maximize
its utility (5), subject to (1)–(4) and the budget constraint (6) for period t, and all periods thereafter. In so doing, it takes
as given habits st = xct−1.
4 To simplify the model's exposition and interpretation, define U(xpt , st) ∶= V
p(xpt , st) −C(x
p
t + 𝛾st)
as the net utility of a given lifetime unhealthy consumption allocation (st, xpt ) of the parent in period t. The first-order
conditions are (see Online Appendix A)
Ux(xp∗t , x
c∗
t−1) − 1 − 𝜏t = 0, (7)
V cx (xc∗t ) − 1 − 𝜏t + 𝛼Us(x
p∗
t+1, x
c∗
t ) = 0, (8)
where the asterisk indicates the decentralized solution. According to (7), the parent chooses its own unhealthy consump-
tion such that the net marginal utility, Ux = V px −Cq, is equal to the marginal monetary cost 1+𝜏 t. Equation (8) states that
the parent sets the child's unhealthy consumption such that the marginal utility, V cx , is equal to the perceived long-term
marginal costs, −𝛼Us = −𝛼(V ps − 𝛾Cq) > 0, plus the marginal monetary cost, 1+𝜏 t. Hence, in the case of a zero tax, 𝜏 t = 0,
the parent considers only part of the child's future costs, creating an externality reflected by the share of marginal costs
that it ignores, that is, −(1 − 𝛼)Us.
Lagging the equations in (7) by one period yields
Ux(xp∗t+1, x
c∗
t ) − 1 − 𝜏t+1 = 0. (9)
For each period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …}, (8) and (9) form a system of equations that determines child consumption in period
t and parent consumption in period t + 1 as functions of the tax rates in period t and period t + 1. Formally, we obtain
xc∗t = X
c(𝜏t, 𝜏t+1) and xp∗t+1 = X
p(𝜏t, 𝜏t+1).5 Differentiating (8) and (9) gives the comparative static results
𝜕xp∗t+1
𝜕𝜏t+1
=
V cxx + 𝛼Uss
Δ
< 0,
𝜕xc∗t
𝜕𝜏t
= Uxx
Δ
< 0, (10)
3These properties of the utility function with respect to habits are satisfied for the most commonly used specifications of habits, namely, the subtractive
habit specification Vp(x, s) = v(x − 𝜃s), with v′ > 0 > v′ ′ and 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1) (see Lahiri & Puhakka, 1998, and Carroll, 2000), and the multiplicative habit
specification Vp(x, s) = v(x∕s𝜃), with v′ > 0 > v′ ′ and 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1) pioneered by Abel (1990).
4Note that the quasi-linearity of the preferences means that the utility-maximizing choices determine only xpt , x
c
t , and z
c
t +z
p
t . The distribution of healthy
consumption between the parent and the child is undetermined, because it does not affect the family utility.
5In Period 0, we obtain from (7) the additional condition Ux(x
p∗
0 , x
c
−1) − 1 − 𝜏0 = 0, where x
c
−1 is predetermined. This condition yields x
p∗
0 as a function
of 𝜏0. Because we subsequently focus on the steady-state only, we can safely ignore this condition from the initial period.
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𝜕xp∗t+1
𝜕𝜏t
= −Uxs
Δ
⋛ 0,
𝜕xc∗t
𝜕𝜏t+1
= −𝛼Uxs
Δ
⋛ 0, (11)
where Δ ∶= UxxV cxx + 𝛼[UxxUss − U2xs] > 0, for stability reasons. An increase in the tax rate in a given period raises the
marginal costs of unhealthy consumption, thus reducing child and parent consumption in that period, as shown in (10).
The decrease in period t child consumption, following an increase in the period t tax rate, has two opposing effects on
parent consumption in t+ 1, characterized by Uxs = V pxs − 𝛾Cqq. On the one hand, it reduces the BMI of the parent in t+ 1.
Therefore, the parent in t+1 may increase its consumption during adulthood (owing to 𝛾Cqq > 0). On the other hand, the
reduction in child consumption in t weakens the habits in t + 1, giving the parent in t + 1 an incentive to reduce its own
consumption (owing to −V pxs < 0). Combining these effects, the first expression in (11) shows that the impact of the period
t tax rate on parent consumption in t+ 1 is ambiguous. Similarly, the reduction in parent consumption in t+ 1, following
an increase in the period t + 1 tax rate, reduces the long-term marginal costs perceived by the parent in t by lowering the
marginal health costs and increases the long-term marginal costs of stronger habits. Owing to 𝛼𝛾Cqq > 0 and −𝛼V
p
xs < 0,
these changes in the perceived marginal costs translate into opposing effects on child consumption in t. Therefore, the
parent may increase or decrease child consumption in t if the period t+ 1 tax rate goes up, as shown in the second part of
(11). Thus, we can define Uxs as the degree of net addictiveness of unhealthy food, where a good is addictive in net terms
if child consumption raises the net marginal utility during adulthood. The intertemporal tax effects in (11) are negative
if unhealthy food is addictive in net terms, and positive otherwise.6
Note, furthermore, that habit formation is not necessary for the existence of an externality in the decentralized solu-
tion. Even when V ps = 0, imperfect altruism creates an externality because of the long-term health costs of unhealthy
consumption during childhood: −(1 − 𝛼)Us = (1 − 𝛼)𝛾Cq > 0. In the special case 𝛼 = 0, the parent is nonaltruistic and
fully ignores the long-term effects of an unhealthy child's diet. In contrast, when 𝛼 = 1, the parent is fully altruistic, and
the decentralized solution is optimal.
4 OPTIMAL POLICY
The present value of social welfare can be expressed as Ŵ0 =
∞∑
t=0
(upt + u
c
t ). Inserting (1)–(4), (6), and the public budget
constraint 𝓁t = 𝜏t(xp∗t + x
c∗
t ) yields
Ŵ0 =
∞∑
t=0
[
e − xp∗t − x
c∗
t + U(x
p∗
t , x
c∗
t−1) + V
c(xc∗t )
]
. (12)
The optimal policy maximizes this welfare function, taking into account the comparative static effects (10) and (11).
In determining the optimal fat tax rate in period t, we must consider the effects on period t child consumption xc∗t =
Xc(𝜏t, 𝜏t+1) and period t + 1 parent consumption xp∗t+1 = X
p(𝜏t, 𝜏t+1). Moreover, the period t tax rate influences period t − 1
child consumption xc∗t−1 = X
c(𝜏t−1, 𝜏t) and period t parent consumption xp∗t = X
p(𝜏t−1, 𝜏t). Differentiating (12) with respect
to 𝜏 t and taking into account these effects and (8) and (9), we obtain for t ∈ {1, 2, …},7
𝜕Ŵ0
𝜕𝜏t
=
[
𝜏t−1 + (1 − 𝛼)Us(xp∗t , x
c∗
t−1)
] 𝜕xc∗t−1
𝜕𝜏t
+ 𝜏t
𝜕xp∗t
𝜕𝜏t
+
[
𝜏t + (1 − 𝛼)Us(xp∗t+1, x
c∗
t )
] 𝜕xc∗t
𝜕𝜏t
+ 𝜏t+1
𝜕xp∗t+1
𝜕𝜏t
= 0.
(13)
6The authors thank an anonymous referee for providing this interpretation.
7In t = 0, the first term in (13) vanishes because xc−1 is predetermined. We can ignore this difference between t = 0 and all other periods because we
subsequently focus on the steady state only.
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As in Goulão and Pérez-Barahona (2014), we focus on the properties of the optimal tax in the steady state, with 𝜏 t−1 =
𝜏 t = 𝜏 t+1 =∶ 𝜏∗. Inserting into (13) and solving gives
𝜏∗ = −(1 − 𝛼)Us Ω with Ω ∶=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 +
𝜕xp∗t
𝜕𝜏t
+ 𝜕x
p∗
t+1
𝜕𝜏t
𝜕xc∗t−1
𝜕𝜏t
+ 𝜕x
c∗
t
𝜕𝜏t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
−1
. (14)
The government would exactly internalize the externality if the tax is equal to the part of the marginal long-term costs
of unhealthy consumption not considered by the parent, that is, −(1 − 𝛼)Us. If the tax is lower (higher) than this level,
the externality is underinternalized (overinternalized). Using expression (14), Online Appendix B proves the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For any 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1), the optimal steady-state fat tax rate 𝜏∗ is strictly positive. In general, however, it
deviates from the first-best policy and is only second-best. We obtain underinternalization (overinternalization) iff
V cxx + 𝛼Uss − Uxs < (>)0. (15)
Increasing the fat tax reduces unhealthy child consumption. This effect is intended because child consumption creates
an externality. At the same time, the increase in the fat tax changes parent consumption, which is not intended because it
does not cause an externality. However, this latter effect is of second order, implying that the optimal tax is strictly positive,
as stated in the first part of the proposition.
The unintended distortion of parent consumption explains why the optimal tax is not first-best, as stated in the second
part of the proposition. A tax rate increase in a given period reduces parent consumption in this period. It may seem that
the optimal tax rate has to underinternalize the external marginal costs, −(1 − 𝛼)Us, in order to mitigate the unintended
reduction in parent consumption. However, in addition to the intra temporal effect, there is an inter temporal effect on
parent consumption in the next period, which may lead to overinternalization. Here, the intratemporal effect is reflected
by 𝜕xp
∗
t+1∕𝜕𝜏t+1 in (10), and 𝜕x
p∗
t+1∕𝜕𝜏t in (11) gives the intertemporal effect, where all expressions are evaluated at the steady
state. The intratemporal effect is negative, whereas the intertemporal effect is ambiguous; recall that it may be positive
because the decrease in consumption during childhood and the corresponding decrease in BMI in adulthood, ceteris
paribus, induces the parent to eat more during adulthood. If the intertemporal effect is positive and larger, in absolute
terms, than the intratemporal effect, then the fat tax has an unintended positive effect on the steady-state consumption
of the parent; thus, the optimal fat tax overinternalizes the external costs. In terms of the model primitives Vp, Vc, and C,
the conditions for underinternalization and overinternalization are given in (15). Furthermore, if unhealthy food is net
addictive (Uxs > 0), the optimal tax underinternalizes the externality, because (15) is negative in this case. However, if
unhealthy food is not addictive in net terms (Uxs < 0), the optimal tax may be larger than the externality.8
5 ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
In the previous analysis, we defined social welfare as the sum of the parent's short-term utility and the child's long-term
utility and excluded the parent's altruistic preferences. This definition is supported by Hammond (1987) and Harsanyi
(1995), among others, because including the parent's altruistic preferences would lead to a “double-counting” of the child's
utility. However, other authors take a welfarist approach and (partially) “double-count” the child's utility; see Kaplow
(1998), Farhi and Werning (2010), Brunner and Pech (2012a), Brunner and Pech (2012b), and Boadway and Cuff (2015).
Following Brunner and Pech (2012b) and Boadway and Cuff (2015), we assume the government puts a weight 𝛿 ∈ [0, 1]
on the parent's long-term utility in the welfare function. Thus, social welfare in period t is
Ŵt = upt + u
c
t + 𝛿𝛼Ŵt+1 + Ŵt+1. (16)
8Overinternalization is obtained, for example, if parents are nonaltruistic (𝛼 = 0) and habits are absent (V pxs = V
p
ss = 0). For Vc(x) = ax − bx
2∕2 and
C(q) = cq2, overinternalization occurs if 𝛾c > b.
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Iterating and evaluating at t = 0 yields the present value of social welfare,
Ŵ0 =
∞∑
t=0
(1 + 𝛿𝛼)t(upt + u
c
t ). (17)
If 𝛿 = 0, there is no “double-counting” and (17) coincides with (12). If 𝛿 = 1, the other extreme case of full
“double-counting” emerges. However, the externality associated with the choice of the child's diet increases with 𝛿. Hence,
in the case 𝛿 > 0, unhealthy food should be taxed even if 𝛼 = 1, that is, even if the parents are fully altruistic. Thus,
adopting a welfarist approach strengthens the case for a positive fat tax.
6 CONCLUSION
We develop an OLG model to analyze imperfect altruism within the family as a rationale for fat taxes. We show that imper-
fect altruism is an argument for taxation of unhealthy food; however, the optimal tax rate is only second-best and may
underinternalize or overinternalize the intergenerational externality. The latter result relies on our implicit assumption
of a uniform tax on parent and child consumption. If taxation can discriminate between parent and child consumption,
a zero tax on the former and a tax equal to the marginal externality on the latter would be sufficient. However, in prac-
tice, it is often difficult or even impossible to tax parent and child food consumption differently. An example of uniform
taxation is the soda tax, the tax base of which, sugary drinks, is consumed by both children and adults.
However, discrimination may be possible if we consider further policy instruments and determinants of obesity. For
instance, the proceeds of the fat tax could be used to finance policies aimed at children, instead of being returned to adults
through lump-sum transfers. One such policy is implemented in the United Kingdom, where proceeds from the soda
tax are used to finance schools' sport provision (HCL, 2017). A further extension may consider other types of unhealthy
behavior (e.g., smoking and drinking alcohol), where early habits influence adult behavior. These extensions are left for
future research.
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